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INTRODUCTION
In this age of international terrorism, the American immigration system is
caught between our national security needs and a socioeconomic imperative to
remain a "nation of immigrants."' Yet the system can be reconceived and
administered in a way that further increases economic opportunities while
better protecting the homeland. To that end, this Note advocates reshaping our
2economic immigration system into a cooperative federalist system in which
the federal government allows states more responsibility for selecting
employment-based immigrants while simultaneously shifting greater federal
resources into immigration services and enforcement.
3
Specifically, Congress should affirmatively decentralize 4 to the states
administrative control over employment-based (EB) immigration decision-
making, in the model of the 1996 welfare reforms and emissions trading
1. Prior historical examples of this tension include America's late-nineteenth-century need for
Chinese labor amid a fear of "vast hordes ... crowding in upon us." See Chae Chan Ping v. United
States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
2. "Cooperative federalism" is one of three models of federalism offered by Peter Spiro, the other
two being central government hegemony and devolutionary federalism. Cooperative federalism, in the
immigration context, entails a "central government retain[ing] primary control and supervision over
immigration decision-making, but enlist[ing] subnational authorities as junior partners and allowfing]
them some discretion to assert or account for particular subnational needs." Peter J. Spiro, Federalism
and Immigration: Models and Trends, 167 INT'L SOC. Sc1. J. (UNESCO) 67, 67 (2001).
3. American immigration control has been considered to be solely a federal power, justified on
foreign policy considerations and notions of powers inherent in national sovereignty. See. e.g.,
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (describing the power to "expel undesirable aliens" as "inherently inseparable
from the conception of nationality"); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) ("It is an accepted
maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them
only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe."). But see Gerald L. Neuman,
The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1839 (1993)
(challenging the assumption that American immigration has always been a federal activity closely linked
to foreign relations).
4. Peter Schuck has distinguished two ways in which a federal policymaker can devolve its power.
The first and most common way is termed "default decentralization," and it entails the "federal
policymaker simply allow[ing] the power to make and implement decisions that might constitutionally
be made at the national level to remain instead where it already is-with a lower level of government or
with private actors." Peter H. Schuck, Introduction: Some Reflections on the Federalism Debate, 14
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 20 (1996). The second type, and the one which I adopt for this proposal, is
called "affirmative decentralization," in which a "federal policymaker actively delegates-downward or
outward-power that she is presently exercising." Id. (emphasis added).
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credits. 5 As discussed in greater detail below, many scholars and policymakers
have called for increasing the states' role in law enforcement 6 or in distributing
public benefits. 7 This Note proposes instead that states exercise greater control
over the admission of employment-based immigrants.
Three basic premises underlie this proposal. First, lawful immigration
produces net benefits for the United States and should be encouraged. Second,
employment-based immigration primarily implicates local economic interests,
such as education and labor regulation. Third, the federal and state
governments' distinctive competencies should be exploited to the benefit of
both immigrants and the entire nation. While the states are more responsive to
local economic needs and interests, the federal government is better positioned
to regulate aspects of immigration affecting the nation as a whole, such as
security, overseas consular administration, and the prevention of spillover and
race-to-the-bottom effects. I elaborate upon these themes throughout the Note.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview and critique
of America's employment-based immigration system. Part II details my
proposal for greater decentralization in immigration administration from the
perspective of the federal and state governments. It includes two existing
models of cooperative federalism to place this proposal in context, as well as
three hypothetical scenarios that show the many uses and benefits of reform.
Part III discusses the likely national consequences of this proposal.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
A. Immigrants vs. Nonimmigrants
To begin, it is useful to define some terms. All noncitizens admitted9 into
the United States are divided into two categories: immigrant and nonimmigrant.
An immigrant is anyone admitted for the purpose of becoming a lawful
5. For an extremely critical view of cooperative federalism, see Michael S. Greve, Against
Cooperative Federalism, 70 MisS. L.J. 557, 559 (2000), who argues that "cooperative federalism is a
rotten idea, its political popularity notwithstanding. Cooperative federalism undermines political
transparency and accountability, thereby heightening civic disaffection and cynicism .... The sooner
we can think of viable means to curtail cooperative programs and to disentangle government functions,
the better off we shall be."
6. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and
Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 367, 376 (1999).
7. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Learning To Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1627,
1637-38 (1997).
8. A note on terminology: I use the term "noncitizen" instead of the more familiar "alien"
throughout this Note, except when "alien" is used in quotation or as a legal term of art.
9. Admission, with respect to noncitizens, is defined as "the lawful entry of the alien into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer." Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) of 1952 § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(13)(A) (2000).
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permanent resident (LPR). 10 Immigrants are divided into five categories:
family-sponsored, diversity, employment-based, refugees,
11 and asylees. 12
Visas for the first three categories are allocated on the basis of preference
categories, subject to an annual quota. Family-sponsored (FS) immigrants have
certain qualifying relatives, namely spouses, parents, and adult children and
siblings, living in the United States. "Diversity" immigrants, on the other hand,
are immigrants admitted under a complex admissions system of interlocking
formulae and multiyear measurements created by Congress in 1990 to increase
immigration opportunities from underrepresented countries and regions of the
world. Together, family-sponsored and diversity immigrants comprise about
half of all lawful entrants into the United States each year.' 
3
Nonimmigrants, by contrast, are defined in certain subsections of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 14 Generally, any noncitizen seeking
admission to the United States is "presumed to be an immigrant,"'15 and
therefore, to rebut that presumption (and its attendant higher entry
requirements), must fit herself into one of the statutory nonimmigrant classes.
Each subsection of section 101(a)(15) of the INA classifies a type of
nonimmigrant, and these subsections have come to be popularly associated
with that category of admission. Thus, for example, the largest noncitizen
group, the "B tourist visa," is in fact a section 101(a)(15)(B) class of
nonimmigrant; 16 an "H-1B specialty occupation visa" is defined in section
101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b); 17 and so on. Other classes of nonimmigrants include
182diplomats, students, 19 fianc6es of American citizens , foreign media
representatives, 21 and guest workers.22 While all nonimmigrants are alike in
10. Technically, however, immigrants are defined by the INA through a "process of elimination,"
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW & POLICY 3-1 (2005), in which an
immigrant is any noncitizen who does not fall within the specific classifications of INA §
101 (a)(15)(A)-(V).
11. INA § 101(a)(42) (defining "refugee" as a person outside of her country of nationality "because
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion").
12. Id. § 208(b)(1) ("[T]he Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien... [who) is a refugee
within the meaning of section 101 (a)(42)(A).").
13. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2005 YEAR BOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 20-22 (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter 2005 YEARBOOK], available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/OIS -2005- Yearbook.pdf. Refugees and
asylees are beyond the scope of this Note and will not be discussed.
14. See INA § 101(a)(15)(A)-(V).
15. Id. § 214(b) (emphasis added).
16. Id. § 101(a)(15)(B) (concerning "an alien.., who is visiting the United States temporarily for
business or temporarily for pleasure").
17. Id. § 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (concerning "an alien.., who is coming temporarily to the United
States to perform services ... in a specialty occupation").
18. Id. § 101(a)(15)(A)(i).
19. Id. § 101(a)(15)(J).
20. Id. § 101(a)(15)(K)(i).
21. Id. § 101(a)(15)(1).
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that they are temporally and/or functionally restricted in their access to the
United States, most are not numerically restricted. In FY2005, of the 32 million
nonimmigrants admitted, over 28 million came for business or pleasure.
23
B. A Detailed Account of the Current Employment-Based Immigration System
1. Labor Certification
Labor certification is required for permanent employment-based
immigrants, though petitioners for employment-based nonimmigrants must also
undergo a less rigorous certification procedure. Certification purports to ensure,
first, that there are not "sufficient [American] workers who are able, willing,
qualified ... and available at the time of application for a visa"; and second,
that should the applicant noncitizen be admitted, the "employment of such alien
will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the
United States similarly employed. 24
If the petitioned-for occupation is not on a pre-approved list such as the
Department of Labor's "Schedule A," 25 the process is quite complicated. First,
the petitioning employer must file a Department of Labor (DOL) application
with the local Employment and Training Administration office (the "local
office") serving the area where the applicant is to be employed.26 Significantly,
the local office, also known as a State Employment Security Agency, is an
agency of the state and not of the DOL. 27 Thus, state officials are the
gatekeepers to whom petitioners must first apply.
Under the supervision of the local office, employers must advertise the job
opportunity to the local community. Moreover, the employer must match or
exceed the local prevailing wage for that job occupation. 29 After the completion
of these requirements, a "Certifying Officer" makes the final administrative
22. See, e.g., id. § 101(a)(15)(H), (L), (0).
23. See 2005 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at 66.
24. INA § 212(a)(5)(A)(i)(I)-(ll).
25. The Department of Labor publishes a short list of pre-certified occupations as "Schedule A."
See 20 C.F.R. § 656.5(a) (2006). Noncitizens applying for these occupations may bypass the Department
of Labor and may be reviewed directly by an immigration officer in the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and
Immigration Services, see id. § 656.15(a), who then determines whether the applicant is qualified or not
for the occupation.
26. Id. § 656.17(a).
27. See id. § 655.715 (defining a "State Employment Agency" as "the state agency designated...
to cooperate with ... the Department of Labor in the operation of the national public workforce
system"). Congress had required the states, in order to receive certain employment-related
appropriations, to "designate or authorize the creation of a State agency vested with all powers necessary
to cooperate with the Secretary [of Labor]." 29 U.S.C. § 49(c) (2000).
28. See2OC.F.R. § 656.17(e).
29. See id. § 656.17(0(7).
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determination subject to administrative court review.30 Notably, this Certifying
Officer is the first federal official engaged in the application process, who




As with family-sponsored and diversity immigrants, employment-based
(EB) immigrants are similarly divided into preference categories. The five
categories, in order of descending preference, are: priority workers (EB-1);
members of the professions holding advanced degrees, or who are of
exceptional, as opposed to extraordinary, ability (EB-2); skilled workers and
professionals without an advanced degree (EB-3); certain "special immigrants"
(EB-4); and entrepreneurs (EB-5). 32 The worldwide quota for EB immigrants is
currently set at 140,000, plus any remaining family-sponsored visas from the
previous fiscal year.33 Spouses and children of EB immigrants are also
deducted from each relevant category, 34 and thus the actual number of EB
"workers" is far less than it might seem.
Further restrictions apply to each preference category. Some of the
categories are assigned quotas of their own, with EB-1 priority workers, for
example, receiving 28.7% of the EB quota, as well as any remaining visas not
used by the EB-4 and EB-5 preference categories. 35 The categories are also
divided into smaller classes: priority workers are composed of (1) applicants
with a proven extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or
athletics; 36 (2) outstanding professors and researchers; 37 and (3) certain
multinational executives and managers. 38 These subgroups may have their own
30. See id. §§ 656.24(b), 656.26(a).
31. See id. § 656.3 (defining "Certifying Officer").
32. See INA § 203(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 153(b)(1)-(6) (2000).
33. See id. § 201(d)(1)(A), (C). In FY 2005, of the 246,878 total EB immigrants accepted, the
number of visas issued in each of the five categories was 64,731, 42,597, 129,070, 10,134, and 346,
respectively. See 2005 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at 18 & tbl.6. Some categories used fewer than the
full number of visas allowed by law.
34. See INA § 203(d).
35. See id. § 203(b)(1).
36. Federal regulations define "extraordinary ability" as "mean[ing] a level of expertise indicating
that the individual is one of that small percentage who [has] risen to the very top of the field of
endeavor." Petitions for Employment-Based Immigrants, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(2) (2007) (emphasis
added). Evidence of extraordinary ability may include such things as published material in professional
publications, membership in elite professional associations, evidence of commercial success in the arts
as shown by box office receipts, etc. See id. § 204.5(h)(3).
37. "Outstanding" professors and researchers must be recognized internationally as outstanding in
their academic field. Id. § 204.5(i)(3)(i). Evidence acceptable for proving that an applicant is outstanding
include such things as published material in professional publications, membership in academic
associations, and major prizes or awards. Id.
38. See INA § 203(b)(I)(A)-(C). In contrast to the other EB-1 categories, multinational executives
need not be either extraordinary or outstanding, but merely must have been "employed outside the
Vol. 25:349, 2007
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caps or quotas to apply.
39
Moreover, the labor certification requirements can vary among preference
categories. While EB-I applicants, unlike most EB immigrants, do not require• - 40
labor certification, all except extraordinary ability applicants require a job
offer from a U.S. employer.4 ' Merely being an applicant with a particular
extraordinary ability is insufficient, however; one must enter in order to
continue work in the area of that extraordinary ability. 42 Therefore, a Nobel
Prize-winning economist may not enter to pursue her dream of becoming a
country western singer (at least not before she adjusts to LPR status).
3. Employment-Based Nonimmigrants
Nonimmigrants who can engage temporarily in some form of work or
employment encompass many of the different categories of nonimmigrant visa.
Thus, for the purposes of this Note, I use the term "guest worker" to refer to
those nonimmigrants admitted to the United States solely for the purpose of
working temporarily in their individual capacities. I use this term in contrast to
nonimmigrants whose work eligibility is ancillary to some other purpose, such
as diplomacy, international commerce, or cultural and religious exchange.
Removing those nonimmigrant classes, I use "guest workers" only to refer to
classes "H" and "0."
The H class of guest workers is particularly relevant to this Note. 3
Excluding trainees, 4 there are four H subgroups, all of which require a job
offer and labor certification. The first, the "H-IB," may be the most well-
known of all the guest worker classes. H-lB guest workers come to the United
United States for at least one year in a managerial or executive capacity by a firm or corporation." 8
C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(3)(A). Also, compare the multinational executive immigrant category with the "L"
nonimmigrant class, which includes noncitizen managers, executives, and those with "specialized
knowledge." INA § 101(a)(15)(L).
39. For example, religious workers, a subclass of the EB-4 "special immigrants" category, are
capped at 5000. INA § 203(b)(4).
40. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(5), (i)(3)(iii), 0)(5).
41. See id.
42. See INA § 203(b)(l)(A)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(5).
43. The 0 class, in which there were 37,350 people admitted in FY 2005, see 2005 YEARBOOK,
supra note 13, at 66 tbl.26, is reserved for noncitizens (including their support staff) with an
"extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics which has been demonstrated
by sustained national or international acclaim." INA § 101(a)(15)(O)(i). Required evidence for this
special class includes major awards like the Nobel Prize, publications in major journals, command of a
high salary, critical acclaim, or nomination for an Academy Award. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(o)(3)(iii)-(v).
Guest workers on an 0 visa may remain for a maximum of three years, which must be petitioned for by
an employer, but no labor certification is required-though there are special provisions for the denial or
suspension of the visa in the event of strike or work stoppage. See id. § 214.2(o)(1)(i), (6)(iii), (14).
44. See INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(iii) (concerning an individual "who is coming temporarily to the
United States as a trainee ... in a training program that is not designed primarily to provide productive
employment" (emphasis added)).
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States to perform services "in a specialty occupation," 45 such as computer
programming, and must be approved by the DOL.46 Unlike numerically
unrestricted nonimmigrant classes like "F" students and "B" tourists, H-lBs are
currently restricted to a quota of 65,000. 4 7 Furthermore, they may remain in the
United States for a maximum of six years,48 though they may apply for
adjustment to LPR status during that period. The second subgroup, the H-i C, is
a three-year category for nurses created by Congress in the Nursing Relief for
Disadvantaged Areas Act.4 9 This visa class was added in 1999 to address a
perceived shortage of nurses. Though only a modest addition-the number is
capped at 500 foreign nurses for the entire nation 50-H-1Cs are also subject to
labor certification.5 '
The two H-2 categories, by contrast, govern relatively unskilled, seasonal
labor. H-2A pertains to agricultural workers, while H-2B covers
nonagricultural workers coming to fill an unmet labor need. 2 The employer
must file a petition with the Local Employment Service office certifying that
the conditions of wage, labor conditions, and seasonality are all present. These
procedures are relatively straightforward, and applications are typically
approved or rejected within seven days of filing.
53
C. A Critique of the Current Employment-Based Immigration System
Our current employment-based immigration regime ill fits our economic
system. In arrogating the entirety of immigration power to itself, the federal
government has created a rigid national system resistant to experimentation and
unresponsive to local economic conditions. As an exercise in contrast, one need
only imagine a similar system for other local economic matters, such as roads
or schools. If every dollar spent on road construction had to be appropriated in
Washington, undoubtedly it would be more difficult for local community
members to lobby for their streets to be repaved. Similarly, if all school
textbooks had to be purchased at the federal level, it would be more difficult for
45. See id. § 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b); see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(l)(ii)(B)(1). "Specialty occupation"
is defined by statute as an occupation that requires "theoretical and practical application of a body of
highly specialized knowledge, and attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty."
INA § 214(i)(1).
46. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(l).
47. See INA § 214(g)(1)(A). Note that in certain past years the quota has been much higher. Also
note that the quota applies only to actual workers; their accompanying spouses and children are not
deducted from the quota. See id. § 214(g)(2).
48. See id. § 214(g)(4).
49. Pub. L. No. 106-95, 113 Stat. 1312 (1999) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1153, 1182 (2000)).
50. INA § 212(m)(2)(F)(iii)(4).
51. See id. § 212(m)(2).
52. See id. § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii).
53. See Employment & Training Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, H-2A Certification (Nov. 9, 2006),
http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/h-2a.cfm.
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each school to take into account local preferences, priorities, ideas, and
sensibilities.
Moreover, the administrative burdens of our immigration system have long
been accused by many of hobbling American business and economic growth.
For example, the Committee for Economic Development has criticized the
prevailing wage certification process as a difficult one at best.54 In its place, the
Committee has recommended an attestation requirement, bolstered with small,
random audits. 55 Similarly, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has supported a
more flexible prevailing wage standard that includes at least four wage levels.
56
Slow processing is another critical failure of the current system. 57 Months
or years of delay represent not only great economic costs, as needed jobs go
unfilled, but also incalculable human costs for noncitizens uncertain of their
futures. 8 While it is still admittedly too soon to tell conclusively whether the
recent reorganization of the former INS into the Department for Homeland
Security will produce salutary results for speed and efficiency, the increased
security demands on the Department do not portend positive change. Today it
can take as long as 80 to 100 days in some cities for an immigrant applicant just
to get a consular interview. 59 In short, our economic immigration system may
still fairly be described as one "marked by inefficiency, delay, and
frustration... [that] fails to meet the demands of a global marketplace that
rewards mobility and skills."
60
Additionally, the mentality of our current employment-based immigration
system is arguably out of date and ill-suited to a modem knowledge-based
economy. Our economic immigration system was created with labor shortages
of largely fungible workers in mind. This mentality is "strikingly at odds with
today's competitive realities, where firms often choose workers (U.S. or
foreign) because of small differences in qualifications.., that can lead to
substantial differences in the firm's ability to compete. ' 6 1 In the current system,
an economic immigrant is admitted only to provide labor and expertise when no
54. See, e.g., COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., REFORMING IMMIGRATION: HELPING MEET AMERICA'S
NEED FOR A SKILLED WORKFORCE 21 (2001), available at http://www.ced.org/docs/report/
reportjimmigration.pdf; Stuart Anderson, America's Future is Stuck Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2005, at A23 (arguing that immigration difficulties pose an obstacle to America's race to attract top
foreign graduate students).
55. See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 54, at x.
56. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Skilled Worker Visas: H-IB and L-I Visas,
http://www.uschamber.com/issues/index/immigration/hIlb.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
57. See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 54, at 24.
58. See id. at 25.
59. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Visa Issuance, http://www.uschamber.com/
issues/index/immigration/visas.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
60. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 54, at ix.
61. DEMETRIOS PAPADEMETRIOU & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, BALANCING INTERESTS: RETHINKING
U.S. SELECTION OF SKILLED IMMIGRANTS 112 (1996) (emphasis added).
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domestic workers are "able, willing, qualified and available." Thus, in theory, a
minimally qualified domestic applicant (a citizen or legal permanent resident)
must be taken over a more qualified foreign applicant.
But while protecting American labor and ensuring that foreign labor is
turned to only as a last resort can be seen as a reasonable, even laudable, goal,
the system arguably fails even at that. While a rigorous and cumbersome labor
certification system may protect domestic labor by discouraging applications
and artificially keeping admissions below quota (which, incidentally, increases
the number of family-sponsored immigrants admitted, per the current system's
interconnected admissions calculations 62), its complexity and susceptibility to
employers willing to game the system fail to protect American workers.
Labor certification's advertising requirements are a good example of this
match of wits between employers and the DOL. A veritable cottage industry of
fake job advertisements is available to fit the foreign applicant so exactly that
63domestic applicants can be rejected as unqualified. When challenging the
"inside hiring" of a Kansas manufacturing company, a DOL official noted: "It
appears the employer is nitpicking in order to reject the (nonalien)
applicants." 64 Even former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich admitted as much,
stating, "The programs as authorized by the INA are flawed and do not serve
U.S. workers well .... U.S. job applicants have little real chance of being
accepted for many positions.'
65
Finally, the federal identification and management of labor shortages is
neither accurate nor helpful. The recent history and controversy surrounding
the H-lB program is illustrative. 66 As described above, the H-1B is a guest
worker visa for specialty occupations created by Congress in 1952. Also recall
the many restrictions on H-iB workers: labor certification, annual numerical
cap of 65,000, and six-year limits. In response to the tech boom of the late
1990's, Congress dramatically increased, albeit temporarily, the cap on H-1B
workers. 67 In the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act
of 1998, Congress increased the annual cap on H-lB's from 65,000 to 115,000
for two years.68 Again, in the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first
62. See INA § 201(c)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (2000).
63. See PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 61, at 109-10.
64. Mike McGraw, When Foreign Labor Programs Lend a Hand or Go Awry, KAN. CITY STAR,
July 16, 1995, at A15.
65. PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 61, at 111.
66. There are few areas of immigration policy that have received more media attention and
criticism than the H-1B program. One prominent critic, Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates, recently
lambasted the H-lB caps, saying that they undermined American competitiveness and its role as the
world's science and technology leader. See Editorial, High-Tech Brain Drain, WALL ST. J., May 5,
2005, at A14.
67. See Yan Chen, An Examination on Regulating the Employment of Foreign Skilled Workers in
the United States, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 179, 188-89 (2003).
68. See Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(l)(A)(i)-
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Century Act of 2000, Congress further raised the cap to 195,000 for the fiscal
69years until 2003. Yet now it is clear that Congress was increasing the supply
of specialty guest workers just as the tech boom was ending and the country
was entering recession. This exposes the underlying problems with the belief
that the federal government can accurately respond to shifts in supply and
demand in a timely manner.
This belief in government competence at managing immigration supply and
demand is especially dubious when one takes into account the heterogeneous
nature of the American economy. Although after the end of tech boom
Congress's best option for the interests of the entire country may have been to
again reduce the quota of H-lB visas, this would not have been the best
solution for all states or regions. While many states may have desired a cap,
other states, such as Virginia or Texas, may have been actively looking to
increase the influx of skilled workers. Still others might have seen the decline
in wages as an opportunity for needed technological investment in their states.
If state governments had a greater role in decision-making, it would be less
likely that the needs of the few would have to be sacrificed for the needs of the
many-especially when those two needs are not necessarily incompatible.
Of course, decentralizing EB immigration decision-making, as this Note
proposes, is no panacea for the inadequacies of government labor management.
A state could operate an economic immigration system substantially similar to
the current federal system-and could do so even more ineptly. Nevertheless,
when the demand for foreign labor is concentrated in a small number of states,
such as technology workers in California and Washington, state governments
would arguably be more keenly aware of these local labor shortages, more
eager to fix the problem, and more nimble and responsive to labor conditions.
Moreover, the difficulties created by immigration are also typically local:
increased need for local public services, depression of local wages, or
displacement of local workers, for example. Thus, state governments could
better manage the entire trade-off, not just businesses' need for labor. Finally,
allowing the states the opportunity to try different things, and even to make
mistakes, is possible under decentralization without risking the nation's entire
economic system.
A decentralization proposal must be rooted in a normative judgment
regarding the ideal role of the states in our federal system. And what
decentralization offers are the virtues of federalism generally-including
experimentation, local adaptability, greater accountability, competition, and
more avenues for lobbying. These virtues are a part of what David Super calls
(iv) (2000)).
69. See Pub. L. No. 106-313, 114 Stat. 1251 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(A)(iv)
(2000)).
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the pluralist theory of federalism: absent a pressing need to speak with one
national voice or greater economic efficiency, decentralization of authority will
yield a variety of different responses to common problems. 70 This Note seeks to
demonstrate how those virtues might apply in the economic immigration
context.
II. PROPOSED REFORMS
A. Details of the Proposal
In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act,71 decentralizing to an unprecedented degree
the nation's system for administering aid to needy families. The core of welfare
reform was the block grant, 72 which was essentially a fixed grant of federal
money which each state had increased autonomy and flexibility in
administering-though Congress had attached various conditions,73 as well as
bonuses for meeting certain goals such as reductions in illegitimate childbirth.
74
The proposal of this Note, decentralized employment-based immigration
(DEBI), seeks to apply that general approach to our employment-based
immigration system. However, in lieu of money grants, the federal government
will grant the states decision-making authority for blocks of visas.
Instead of the current procedure, outlined in Section I.B, by which
Congress creates complex formulae governing how many employment-based
(EB) immigrants and guest workers may enter the country, 75 Congress should
first abolish all of the employment-based permanent and guest immigration
categories listed in Section I.B, and in their place create two classes of EB
admission, one for permanent immigrants and one for guest workers. In
establishing the guest worker class, Congress would have to set a number of
maximum allowable years, say, six; individual states could choose to permit
guest workers to stay for periods shorter than the maximum allowed. Congress
would then set an annual national quota, one for EB immigrant visas and one
for guest worker visas, and then distribute that amount to the participating
states in proportion to each participating state's total or working-age population
or past immigration levels.
76
70. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2544, 2556 (2005).
71. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 603 (2000).
73. See, e.g., id. § 604(b).
74. See id. § 603(a)(2).
75. See, e.g., INA § 201(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(d) (2000).
76. A "participating state" would be a state (or the District of Columbia) whose agencies, either
through new positive state law or court interpretation of existing law, could lawfully implement the
federal conditions under DEBI. This distinction is necessary to avoid possible state constitutional issues
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A system of initial visa distribution based on population would
disadvantage states that currently receive a disproportionate share of
immigrants, such as California. However, the precise manner of distribution is
not critical to the proposal, as long as the system is widely considered to be fair
and equitable. (Thus, another option could be to base distribution on past
immigration levels.) Moreover, the visa distributions to each state would not be
fixed, but would merely serve as a starting point for possible trading among the
states, analogous to an emissions trading system,77 in which the national quota
would operate as a cap on aggregate allowable economic immigration.
Alternatively, if the EB quota market proved too small or too illiquid, the
trading price could be set by federal law or forced-auction.
Thereafter, each state government would decide, in whatever manner it
thought best, to which individual applicants the visas would go. To make that
determination, the state would need to answer a host of other questions: Which
occupations and skill sets should be favored or expedited? Which companies
and industries should be allowed to sponsor applicants? Should workers be
bound to a particular employer or free to change employers-i.e., to what
extent should portability be allowed? Should an applicant's renewal application
be granted? What reasonable fees should be imposed?
Perhaps most importantly, each state would have to decide whether to use
any of its visa allotment at all, because a state's power to select the type of EB
immigrant would include the power to refuse all economic entrants. Thus,
states with excess visa allotments could also give, trade, or sell them to states
with a greater appetite for employment-based immigrants. But in order to
prevent unexpected or unwanted surges in EB immigration, it would be
necessary for Congress to set a period of time, perhaps one to two years, in
which a state must use or lose its visa allotment. States, with congressional
approval, could also form compacts and pool their allotments for regional
78benefits. In short, the guiding principle of DEBI is for the states to have as
much flexibility and freedom of choice possible within a comprehensive system
of overall restraints set by the federal government.
discussed infra Subsection II.A.5. From here forward, I consider any state acting within the DEBI
framework a participating state.
77. Emissions trading is a market mechanism for managing pollutants, typically greenhouse gases,
in order to prevent climate change. It operates by establishing a cap on the aggregate allowable amount
of pollutants and then "allow[ing] market forces to continually move the allowed emissions to the
highest value uses." Int'l Emissions Trading Ass'n, Market Mechanisms: Introduction,
http://www.ieta.org/ieta/www/pages/index.php?ldSiteTree=26 (last visited Apr. 16, 2007). Thus, "a
company with a low cost opportunity to reduce emissions below its allocation of emission rights can sell
these unneeded rights to a company with limited or uneconomic emission reduction opportunities." Id.
78. This approval of compacts for pooling and trading would be akin to (and perhaps a component
of) Congress's Article I oversight of interstate compacts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall,
without the Consent of Congress... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
foreign Power .. "). However, it bears repeating that the states, in choosing to form compacts, would
be administeringfederal power, not state power.
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1. Role of the Federal Government
In such a system, what role would be left to the federal government?
Though this system would decentralize the administration of employment-
based admissions, it would also enhance federal power over other areas of
immigration. The DEBI system would exist at the intersection of what Peter
Spiro calls immigration benefits and cooperative federalism. 79 The states would
be given greater input only in the area of admissions for federally qualified EB
applicants, while the federal government would retain standard-setting and
supervisory powers. The states would not be given any powers over citizenship,
though DEBI would have important implications for the naturalization power,
which will be discussed at greater length below.
s0
2. Congress
Congress would be the main federal partner in this cooperative federalist
system. Focusing on its core boundary-defining and supervisory powers,
Congress could afford to look at the big picture with respect to employment-
based immigration. Procedurally, Congress could enact DEBI by adopting
individual state immigration proposals as federal law at periodic intervals. So,
for example, Congress could every two or four years enact a revision to the
employment-based sections of the immigration code, incorporating any state
proposals-at what can be called the adoption stage. In the act of adoption,
Congress would have its primary opportunity to review state proposals for
areas of concern. Moreover, because adoption would require bicameralism and
presentment, the President would also have an opportunity to review proposals
and exercise a check (albeit a crude one) through the veto option.
In the alternative, Congress could also delegate to the executive, through
79. Spiro has proposed a two-axis, three-by-three model of immigration federalism, which I adopt
for this proposal. See Spiro, supra note 2, at 67-68. On the first axis, that of immigration power, Spiro
lays out three categories: immigrant rights, immigration enforcement, and immigration benefits.
Immigrant rights include social service benefits for noncitizens as well as the civil and criminal law
governing noncitizens. Immigration benefits, which DEBI attempts to reform, include the power to grant
admission and to confer citizenship. Lastly, immigration enforcement is concerned with border control,
deportations, and other enforcement issues. Id. at 67.
The second axis, the federalism axis, also has three categories: central government hegemony,
cooperative federalism, and devolutionary federalism. Central government hegemony is a system of
government in which the subnational units only have indirect, peripheral roles in decision-making. In a
cooperative federalist system, in contrast, the subnational units have greater discretion "to assert or
account for particular subnational needs," though the central government retains primary control and
decision-making power. Id. Lastly, in a devolutionary federalist model, primary decision-making power
has shifted to the subnational units. Id. Another simpler framework would be to distinguish between
"immigration law" and "alienage law." "Immigration law" would be restricted to the admission and
expulsion of noncitizens, while "alienage law" would encompass public benefits, access to public
education, the franchise, etc. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and
Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 201, 202 (1994). Under such a framework, DEBI would only apply
to immigration law; alienage law would remain unchanged.
80. See infra Subsection III.C.3.
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the Department of Homeland Security, the power of adoption. 81 Then federal
immigration authorities would issue rules to implement each state's proposals.
This would result in a perhaps less cumbersome and more professionalized
adoption stage. However, the executive would then be primarily responsible for
reviewing the state proposals. Congress would, of course, retain the supervisory
powers it holds over all administrative agencies, including committee hearings
and budgetary powers, but its role would be reduced in the process nonetheless.
Regardless of the branch of government given primary supervisory
authority, each state, in its proposal, would prescribe its criteria for admission
and its procedures for protecting and monitoring the status of EB immigrants.
82
Additionally, each state would be authorized to charge reasonable fees to
finance their programs' administrative costs.83 In the event of conflict between
the federal government and a state, the proposal would be rejected and the state
would be invited to resubmit without the objected-to provisions. However, as a
matter of federal-state comity and in accord with the cooperative federalist
principles of DEBI, Congress should refrain from unilaterally altering a state's
proposal.
This mechanism for enacting DEBI, though slightly complicated, would
avoid any potential constitutional issues that might arise were Congress to
devolve or delegate its immigration power to the states. 84 Moreover, the
decentralization mechanism of DEBI, with its strong federal oversight, has
been designed partially in response to critics of an increased state role in the
immigration process. Some fear that states are more vulnerable to nativism or
fiscal belt-tightening at the expense of noncitizens.85 More specifically, the
history of anti-immigrant 86 legislation in individual states, such as Texas or
Califomia, might give a proponent of immigration pause in endorsing any form
of immigration federalism. In the end, although periodic congressional
oversight of individual state systems might not be a complete prophylactic
against excessive immigration restrictions (nor should it be, democratically
speaking), such a strong role should go far in allaying fears of giving states a
81. Thus, henceforth, wherever I refer to Congress's role in the adoption process, the executive can
also be considered in that role.
82. Each state would also indicate its designated person or body responsible for decision-making
and access to the national immigration database discussed infra Subsection II.A.3.
83. 1 would define a fee as "reasonable" if the money collected in total were equal to or less than
the cost of administering the application program. States using fees to make a profit might appear
unseemly, as if they were taking advantage of desperate applicants. The nation would have a public
relations interest, at least, in preventing this type of abuse.
84. See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power,
Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 493, 527-58 (2001) (arguing that the immigration
power is, for textual and policy reasons, an exclusively federal power, which Congress may not devolve
by statute); see also infra Subsection II.A.5.
85. See Wishnie, supra note 84, at 554.
86. Though one perhaps may not consider measures targeting only illegal immigrants as "anti-
immigrant" per se.
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greater role in employment-based immigrant selection. Finally, built-in federal
review will provide a continual democratic check on the national DEBI
experiment as a whole.
At this adoption stage, Congress could set the total number of EB
immigrants for that year, confident that each state would make the sorts of
determinations best suited to its own conditions. Congress would have a special
responsibility to prevent or mitigate the various race-to-the-bottom or spillover
effects that decentralization might permit. The utility of a federal standard can
be seen in areas like minimum wage or child labor laws, in which a national
floor allows for all states to benefit from a widely desired standard without fear
of employers decamping for a sister state with lower standards. Some scholars,
such as Akhil Amar, have argued that managing these economic ill effects
should be the main concern of Congress under its Commerce Clause powers.
87
Although one state's proposed admissions standards might not be of
concern when viewed in isolation, a facially legitimate admission standard
might still disadvantage sister states. For example, heavy admissions coupled
with inadequate labor standards and enforcement might create a destabilizing
economic (and, indeed, human rights) situation for an entire region. And while
the states already play a key role in the setting of labor standards, the
possibility of outlier states will always exist. In such a case, Congress would
regulate the conflict by prescribing certain minimum standards for all states, for
example regarding age, education level, or workplace safety.
Furthermore, federal law would remain the positive source of visa-issuing
authority, and Congress could either refuse to issue visas for certain types of
individuals-in effect maintaining inadmissibility criteria 8--or even reject a
state's proposal entirely. 89 Congress could also delegate this oversight to the
executive, as it currently does with all immigration administration. 90 This
power would be a critical national check on the expanded opportunities for
state experimentation under DEBI. For example, if a state were to institute a
87. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 108 (2005) ("Under a broad
reading, if a given problem genuinely spilled across state or national lines, Congress could act.
Conversely, a problem would not truly be 'with' foreign regimes or 'among' the states, so long as it
remained wholly internal to each affected state, with no spillover. On this view, legal clarity might be
advanced if lawyers and judges began referring to these words not as 'the commerce clause,' but rather
as 'the international-and-interstate clause' or the 'with-and-among clause.').
88. See, e.g., INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182a (2000) (listing classes of aliens ineligible for visas or
admission).
89. This federal, or congressional, veto would be similar to James Madison's proposal that the
federal government have a veto over obnoxious state laws generally. See Letter from James Madison to
George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/
v I ch8s6.html ("[A] negative in all cases whatsoever on the legislative acts of the States, as heretofore
exercised by the Kingly prerogative, appears to me to be absolutely necessary, and to be the least
possible encroachment on the State jurisdictions.").
90. See, e.g., NA § 240A(a) (delegating to Attorney General power to cancel removal for
aliens in certain situations).
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visa application process that limited qualifications to a certain ethnic or
religious group, Congress might decide that such a procedure offended national
principles and might refuse to approve that state's system.
Though Congress may choose to engage in this type of oversight of state
systems, there would be limits to its freedom of action ex post. Specifically,
while Congress may restrict or forbid certain types of applicants, it could not
revoke applications for certain individuals, once admitted. Congressional
singling out of individuals for disfavored treatment would pose grave
constitutional problems with respect to bills of attainder,9' as well as legislative
encroachment on the proper adjudicatory functions of the judiciary and the
executive.
Congress's role in DEBI, though the most powerful as the source of
positive law, would ideally be used sparingly. To ensure maximum state
flexibility of action, Congress must set boundaries as permissively as national
needs allow. Thus, while setting a maximum (or even minimum) level of
immigration or basic diversity criteria would be both necessary and proper,
merely importing into DEBI the complex formulae and restrictions from the
diversity visa program, for example, would be highly undesirable.
3. The Executive
Under DEBI, the executive would continue its administration of the
nation's entry and exit system and its prosecution of lawbreakers, with the most
significant change being the abolition of the DOL's certification role-to be
replaced by each state's own labor protection agencies, if desired. The DOL
could thereafter shift its focus to other areas of greater institutional competence.
For example, a DOL priority could be to ensure that immigrants were not being
exploited by employers or states. The executive would also maintain its
bureaucratic role in screening and processing applicants abroad and at the
borders. Thus, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
immigration enforcement is currently run by two agencies, the Bureau of
Customs & Border Protection (CBP) and the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE). As CBP's main responsibility is protecting the
borders and preventing illegal entry, there would be no change under DEBI in
that agency's role. The role of ICE-i.e., the prosecution and enforcement of
the immigration laws-would also remain essentially unchanged.
The main issue that decentralization would raise for ICE would be one of
coordination. Yet with modem database technology, coordination is not a
particularly difficult problem to solve conceptually, though it might be in
practice. ICE, as a law-enforcement agency, must necessarily be spread out
91. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, c1. 3.
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among all the states. Therefore, one solution would be the creation of a secure
centralized database capable of tracking the status of all noncitizens throughout
the United States-a "National Immigration Database."
In creating such a database, the United States could draw on the expertise
of other nations. For example, in Germany, a nation with a history of
immigration federalism, 92 immigration coordination is accomplished through
the Central Aliens Register,93 a database containing more than 20 million
records on all foreigners residing in Germany for more than three months. In
2003 alone, over 17 million queries and entries were made to the Register,
94
allowing immigration to be managed at the local level with complete
information. With such a system, a state immigration official in Hamburg has
access to the same information as a federal official in Berlin. Criminal activity,
economic data, re-entry information, and the like may all be easily accessed
through the Register.
This Register can thus serve as a model for a national immigration
database. And as a comprehensive American database would be far larger than
the German one, it would be especially critical to create a system with the best
elements of the German example, yet that is compatible with existing American
federal-state databases such as the Federal Trade Commission's "Consumer
Sentinel" database 95 or the FBI's National Instant Criminal Background Check
System.
96
Within DEBI, state administrative bodies would then need access to such a
national immigration database. Thereby, states could alert ICE when, for
example, a guest worker overstays her work authorization period or an
immigrant changes employment or moves to another state. And for maximum
efficiency purposes, there would need to be only one database for all
noncitizens, EB and non-EB, by which ICE could be kept abreast of the status
of all legal entrants to the country. Indeed, in our post-9/11 security
environment, efforts are already underway to better link state law enforcement
agencies to federal immigration databases.97 Thus, a national immigration
92. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 74 (F.R.G.); see also Gerald L. Neuman,
Immigration and Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 35,
41-43 (1990); Cem Ozdemir, Germany's Integration Challenge, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 221, 221
(2006) (describing Germany's traditional resistance to the notion of its being a "classical immigration
country").




95. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcers Tackle
Deceptive Spam and Internet Scams (Nov. 13, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/11/netforce.htm.
96. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, NICS Program Summary, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/
nics.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2006).
97. See, e.g., Rick Lyman, In Georgia Law, a Wide-Angle View of Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, May
12, 2006, at A23.
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database within DEBI could take advantage of that momentum toward greater
federal-state coordination.
98
As with CBP, the Department of State would continue in its role as
administrative gatekeeper through America's network of consulates. However,
that role would become more complex. For non-EB applicants, there would be
no change. But for EB applicants, a double form of screening would be
necessary. Thus, an EB applicant would apply at her nearest consulate 99 for a
visa, and the application would then be forwarded to any states to which she
wished to apply.
Once a state has approved an applicant and that applicant has accepted the
terms of admission, she would be subject to federal screening by the consular
officers, ensuring that the applicant is admissible by national standards-for
example, not a known terrorist or a carrier of an infectious disease. After
successful screening, the consulate would issue the appropriate visa, which
would include information on the host state and the terms of validity. Prior to
entry, all of this information would be entered into the centralized database
within the Department of Homeland Security. And, as it does now, the
executive would continue to have an absolute veto over any visa issuance or
admission for national security or policy reasons.'
° °
The Department of Justice would retain its immigration adjudicatory body,
the Executive Office for Immigration Review, which includes the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA). Their roles would not change. While states would
be free to add layers of procedural protection within their state administrative
bodies, the BIA would remain the ultimate and final administrative body before
access to the federal court system is allowed. Indeed, maintaining the dominant
position of the BIA for EB immigrants and guest workers and for non-EB
immigrants would be one of the federal government's primary ways of
exercising oversight in this cooperative federalist model. Moreover, the BIA
would ensure that state administrative processes were complying with national
notions of fairness and due process, and that noncitizens were not being
deprived of their rights arbitrarily or capriciously. Statutorily, the BIA's job
98. There might be some concern that greater federal-state law enforcement coordination in the
immigration context might discourage illegal noncitizens from cooperating with police. However, the
creation of a national immigration database has no bearing on whether states or localities enact laws
requiring police to arrest known illegal noncitizens. The database would merely enable federal and state
authorities to keep track of the status of noncitizens efficiently; what local police do with that
information is a separate issue.
99. Incidentally, consular officials could play a role prior to this stage through the dissemination of
materials to the host country and to applicants of information on each state (for example, its geography,
climate, or history) and the types of candidate favored by each state (e.g., young applicants for Iowa,
applicants with nursing experience for Florida).
100. See, e.g., INA § 236A(a)(I)-(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(1)-(3)(b) (2000) ("The Attorney
General shall take into custody any alien who ... is engaged in any other activity that endangers the
national security of the United States.").
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would become more complex, as it would be responsible for interpreting a
federal code with dozens of state-by-state subsections. But, analogous to the
constitutional command that federal courts apply state law on nonfederal
questions,' 0' this is an unavoidable cost to having a federal system.
Though the DEBI system would reshape only the employment-based part
of American immigration law into a cooperative federalist mold, it would still
have a profound impact on other aspects of the immigration power-most
evidently for the executive. In short, DEBI is a call for the executive to shift its
limited resources to the broader goals of homeland security, enforcement, and
abuse prevention,10 2 and not to the processing of EB immigration applications
and worker certifications. More specifically, a focused federal government
could seek greater speed and efficiency in the admission, naturalization,
investigation, incarceration, and removal of noncitizens.
10 3
4. The Judiciary
Of the three branches of government, the judiciary would change least in a
decentralized system. The federal court system would continue to adjudicate
removals and naturalizations and to exercise oversight over administrative
bodies such as the BIA. Moreover, the courts would continue to be constrained
by the jurisdiction-setting and review-limiting powers of Congress. Thus, DEBI
would have no effect on recent legislation to limit all federal review of final
orders of removal to the circuit courts under the REAL ID Act.
10 4
5. The Role of the States
If the states are to become more than mere "field offices ' 05 of the federal
101. Cf Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that, except in matters governed by
the U.S. Constitution or by acts of Congress, state law is to be applied in diversity cases).
102. For a more critical view of the federal government's immigration enforcement efforts, see
Schuck & Williams, supra note 6, at 372, which describes "the INS's failure to establish an effective
criminal-alien removal system." Peter Schuck and John Williams conclude that the root cause of the
INS's failure is "[a] mismatch in government incentives": while the INS "is solely responsible for
enforcing the nation's immigration laws," it is unable to administer "the radically fragmented removal
system," and while local agencies "spend money arresting, identifying, detaining and supervising
criminal aliens," they do not have power to enforce federal immigration policy "unless the INS
explicitly delegates it to them." Id. at 458. Schuck and Williams also call for a federalist solution to this
problem, namely "the devolution of some immigration enforcement authority." Id. at 376. Though my
Note calls for the concentration of federal energies into enforcement instead ofbenefits, it does not rule
out the implementation of the policy initiatives in the Schuck and Williams proposal.
103. A word on the mechanics of DEBI: I envision that the federal government and the states
would interact primarily through the centralized database. Thus, a state could submit a visa approval to
the system, which would then be transmitted to the executive for security screenings and consular
approval. Likewise, a state could report a noncitizen in violation of his or her employment conditions,
which would then alert ICE to initiate removal proceedings.
104. See Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, § 106(a), 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat.) 240, 297-301, (to be
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)).
105. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 777 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in
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immigration bureaucracy, DEBI cannot be enacted by the federal government
alone-it must be affirmatively and legally embraced by the state governments.
Thus, each participating state must produce a slate of desired applicant criteria
and procedures in its state proposal for Congress to review and accept at the
adoption stage. In the simplest scenario, each state would pass a resolution ° 6 to
be submitted to Congress through its normal lawmaking procedures.
However, DEBI, and cooperative federalist programs in general, raise two
broad constitutional issues. The first is the "anticommandeering" principle,
which holds that the federal government cannot force the states to enact or
carry out federal laws. In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that the federal government could not compel the state of New York to take
title to low-level radioactive waste.10 7 The Court concluded that when Congress
has the authority to regulate private activity directly, it may offer the states a
choice between regulating according to federal standards or having state law
pre-empted by federal regulation.10 8 Moreover, the Court reaffirmed Congress's
broad authority under the Spending Clause to condition the receipt of federal
funds on state compliance.
10 9
The Court shortly thereafter reinforced its New York decision in Printz v.
United States.110 In Printz, the Court held that, just as the federal government
could not compel state legislatures to enact or enforce federal regulatory
programs, the government could not conscript state executive officers to
enforce a federal program. 111 Additionally, the Court clarified that mere
compensation of states for regulation efforts would not immunize federal
coercion from constitutional attack.1 12 Thus, these federalism decisions were
not strikes against unfunded federal mandates, but strikes for state sovereignty
principles rooted in the separation of powers, the Tenth Amendment, the
unitary executive theory, and other structural arguments.
The second constitutional issue is whether and to what extent state agencies
may justify their actions based on federal law. According to Philip Weiser, this
fundamentally state law question is an area of "increasing dissonance" between
reality and jurisprudence. 113 Because state agencies would process applications
part and dissenting in part) ("State legislative and administrative bodies are not field offices of the
national bureaucracy. Nor are they think tanks to which Congress may assign problems for extended
study.").
106. Because states could not, constitutionally, pass an immigration law, states would have to issue
some nonbinding final legislative product, such as a resolution, which would not have the force of law
unless and until Congress adopts it.
107. 505 U.S. 144, 149, 177 (1992).
108. See id. at 167.
109. Seeid. at 145.
110. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Ill. Id. at 935.
112. See id. at 930.
113. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79
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and provide services to admitted EB immigrants in accordance with federal law
under DEBI, this issue might well arise. Thus, for example, a state court might
find that a local agency has no authorization under state law to enforce federal
immigration rules or to provide services to EB immigrants in the state.
DEBI avoids these two constitutional problems through incorporation of
only participating states into the system. 114 Furthermore, while the Court has
yet to articulate a clear limit to Congress's power to coerce under the Spending
Clause,'15 DEBI does not seek to come into force through such heavy-handed
tactics. States would be asked to join of their own volition and, additionally,
would be allowed an exit option" 6 from the program. However, the inability to
receive any allocation of EB visas would likely be a strong inducement for
states to join and remain within the program.
B. Other Examples of Cooperative Federalism
As an example of cooperative federalism, DEBI would not be
unprecedented. This Note offers as examples two existing models of
cooperative federalism from the United States and Canada: the State Children's
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) and the federalist immigration pact
between the Canadian national government and the province of Quebec.
1. The State Children's Health Insurance Program
SCHIP was created in 1997 to provide funds to the states in order to
"initiate and expand the provision of child health assistance to uninsured, low-
income children."' 117 The Act further provided that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services should provide billions of dollars to states with federally
approved plans to extend healthcare coverage to children not already covered
by Medicaid.' 18 SCHIP was supposed to represent "a new form of cooperative
federalism where the federal government provides the primary financing,
formulates the basic framework for the program, and sets a minimum set of
performance standards (a floor) that the states must meet."" i9
As a matter of primary government responsibility, healthcare differs
N.C. L. REV. 663, 663 (2001).
114. See supra note 76.
115. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding a federal statute withholding
a portion of highway funds from states that permitted the purchase of alcohol by those under twemty-
one).
116. See Weiser, supra note 113, at 696-97 (discussing the importance of state exit options to the
anticommandeering doctrine).
117. Balanced Budget Act, Pub. L. No. 105-33, tit. IV, § 4901(a), 11I Stat. 251, 552 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1397aa (2000)).
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(1).
119. Robert F. Rich et al., The State Children's Health Insurance Program: An Administrative
Experiment in Federalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 107, 109 (2004).
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significantly from the immigration area. As discussed above, regulation of
immigration is solely the province of the federal government under the
Constitution. 120 Indeed, some scholars argue that immigration can only be
regulated by the federal government.1 21 Healthcare policy, on the other hand, is
not explicitly assigned in the Constitution either to the federal government or to
the states. 122 Thus, as a default, healthcare policy must properly be considered
an area reserved to the states per the Tenth Amendment.
Despite these differences, SCHIP represents many positive aspects of
cooperative federalism, such as state flexibility in policy implementation,
precise federal parameters, and rigorous federal oversight. States choosing to
enroll in SCHIP have great discretion in setting eligibility and cost-sharing
requirements, creating outreach programs, and measuring program
performance. 123 They may choose whether to include such services as mental
and vision services' 24 or whether to charge co-pays, 125 but they must operate
within clear federal guidelines. For example, though the states have discretion
in deciding whether to include certain services, basic services, such as surgical
care, x-ray services, and impatient care, are required by the federal
government. 126 Additionally, while states may charge co-pays, the federal
government places restrictions on the use of co-pays for preventative services
and for children in families below 150% of the poverty level.
127
These aspects of SCHIP are very similar to how DEBI would operate. For
example, while states would be able to charge application fees to pay for all or
part of the costs of administration, the federal government could cap the fees or
could place restrictions on fees for certain types of applicants, such as guest
workers applying for adjustment to LPR status. Additionally, the federal
government could mandate minimum services (a floor) that states must provide
to EB immigrants once they arrive in the country. In essence, the law would
say, "If you choose to join this program, you agree to provide a certain basic
quality of care to our guest workers." But, as with SCHIP, states would be
allowed to exceed that minimum standard. Indeed, in a competitive
120. See supra text accompanying note 3; see also DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976)
("Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.... But the Court has
never held that every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration
and thus per se pre-empted by this constitutional power.").
121. See Wishnie, supra note 84, at 527-58.
122. See James E. Holloway, Revisiting Cooperative Federalism in Mandated Employer-Sponsored
Health Care Programs Under the ER1SA Preemption Provision, 8 QUINNIPIAc HEALTH L.J. 239, 245
(2005) (discussing whether healthcare policy is an inherent government obligation under the Federal
Constitution or state constitutions).
123. See Rich et al., supra note 119, at 114.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1397cc(c)(2) (2000).
125. Id. § 1397cc(e)(1)(A).
126. Id. § 1397cc(c)(1).
127. Id. § 1397cc(e)(2)-(3).
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environment, quality of service and outreach might be a way in which states
attempt to distinguish themselves from others.
Both DEBI and SCHIP are intertwined with larger programs dominated by
the federal government-Medicaid and the national immigration system,
respectively. Thus, changes ushered in by SCHIP or DEBI will affect the
functioning of the larger federal programs. For example, because SCHIP
funding cannot be used to replace Medicaid funding,' 28 this necessarily affects
the eligibility criteria for low-income children under SCHIP. Likewise, because
spouses and unmarried children of LPR immigrants are given some degree of
family-sponsored preference,' 29 employment-based LPR immigrants will also
have chain effects through the federally controlled family-sponsored system.
Moreover, the connections between all of these programs are dynamic, so
one must always be conscious of the effects that change in one program might
cause in others. For instance, if Congress were to expand the entitlement
coverage of low-income children under Medicaid, state SCHIP plans, outreach
efforts, and financial considerations might all be affected. And if Congress ever
altered, expanded, or contracted the eligibility criteria under the family-
sponsored program, the stream of immigrants into the states would also
fluctuate. This connectivity is not a problem per se, but rather an area that both
sides, particularly Congress, should take into account when considering any
changes to the connected programs.
Rigorous federal oversight would also be brought to bear in DEBI as with
SCHIP. In SCHIP, the Secretary of Health and Human Services is empowered
to issue rules and regulations, to require data reporting, 13 and generally to hold
states to their submitted proposals. 31 Most importantly, the Secretary has the
ultimate authority to approve each state's plan of action' 32 and to sanction
states for noncompliance through the withholding of funds. 133 Similarly, states
under DEBI would be subject to audit and review by the Departments of
Homeland Security and Labor.' 34 Moreover, in addition to its review of state
plans at the adoption stage, Congress could empower the executive to suspend
plans in the event of state malfeasance or plan noncompliance.
Finally, the nature of goals in both DEBI and SCHIP differ at the federal
and state levels. In SCHIP, it is expected that federal and state goals will
overlap, yet not be the same. Thus, the federal goal for SCHIP was the
extension of healthcare coverage to 25% of the nation's estimated 10.7 million
128. See Rich et al., supra note 119, at 115.
129. See NA § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2000).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1397hh(c).
131. See Rich et al., supra note 119, at 115.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ff(a)(2).
133. Id. § 1397ff(d)(2).
134. See infra Section 111.D.
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uninsured children. 135 By contrast, a state may have had the less lofty goal of
increasing its type of coverage, for example by adding vision care, or
expanding the number of children with basic coverage. Similarly, as will be
discussed in the next Section, while the goals of the federal government may be
more abstract, i.e. immigration and economic growth, the policy goals of the
several states may vary greatly-from meeting nurse shortages to addressing
depopulation crises. But, ultimately, it is enough that the goals of all are not
mutually exclusive and both federal and state governments are moving in the
same direction.
2. The Example of Quebec
Under Canadian federalism,1 36 regulation of immigration is an area of
concurrent jurisdiction, albeit with federal supremacy.' 37 Immigration has been
part of the 300-year-old struggle of how best to accommodate a distinct Quebec
within a united Canada. There have been two important immigration compacts
between the Canadian federal government and Quebec. The first, the Cullen-
Couture Accord of 1978, allowed for unprecedented Quebecois control over
immigration into that province. Quebec was given broad authority to select
immigrants, in particular by favoring applicants with French language skills.'
38
Quebec's special place in the Canadian immigration system was highlighted by
the fact that Quebec was the only province with its own Ministry of
Immigration, 139 permitted by then-Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to operate
separate immigration offices in Canada's embassies abroad. 140
The second agreement, the Quebec-Ottawa Accord of 1991, entrenched and
expanded Quebecois prerogatives. Quebec was given exclusive control over
immigrant selection. Additionally, Quebec won a guarantee of 30% of total
Canadian immigration, direct control over immigrant services, large monetary
federal grants, and official recognition of its overseas immigration offices.
14 1
The federal government retained responsibility for setting national standards
135. See Rich et al., supra note 119, at 131.
136. Canadian and American systems of federalism differ in certain significant respects. For
example, they differ with respect to the Canadian federal government's ability to form compacts with
the individual provinces in making immigration regulations and the provinces' ability to insulate
unconstitutional legislation "notwithstanding" the Canadian Charter. See Martha A. Field, The Differing
Federalisms of Canada and the United States, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1992, at 107, 116-17
(discussing the "notwithstanding" clause of the Canadian Constitution).
137. See Kevin Tessier, Immigration and the Crisis in Federalism: A Comparison of the United
States and Canada, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 211,222-23 (1995).
138. See id. at 224-25.
139. Id. at 225.
140. See Alice A. Pellegrino, Meech Lake and the Canadian Constitutional Crisis: The Problem of
Provincial Immigration Control in Federalist Nations, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 751, 766 (1991).
141. See Scott A. Hanna, Note, Shared Powers: The Effects of the Shared Canadian Federal and
Quebec Provincial Immigration Powers on Immigrants, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 75, 85 (1995).
Yale Law & Policy Review
and goals, defining immigrant classes, establishing overall immigration levels,
managing entry to the country, and conducting enforcement activities. 142 The
Accord was widely seen as a triumph for Quebec, and may have been a large
factor in the reduction of secessionist sentiment in the province. 43 Indeed, the
Accord ushered in a series of other bilateral immigration compacts, though far
less expansive in scope, 144 with Manitoba (1996), British Columbia and
Saskatchewan (1998), and Prince Edward Island and Yukon (2001). 141
If the purpose of the federalist immigration pacts was to allow Quebec to
preserve its distinct heritage and thus to preserve the union, perhaps now,
fifteen years later, proponents of the Accords can call them a success. Quebec
has, for now, avoided the fate of Louisiana and has managed to preserve its
language and culture. Moreover, support for Quebec's sovereignty has recently
fallen to a low of 37%. 146
Of course, DEBI is not a response to any perceived constitutional crisis in
the United States. Moreover, the relationship between the U.S. federal
government and the states differs in both law and history from that of the
Canadian federal government and its provinces. However, one notable lesson
from the Canadian experience--other than the benefits of pluralism
generally-is the impact of federalist immigration systems on foreign policy.
While DEBI does not call for the states to set up shop in American embassies
across the globe, neither does it call for the states to stick their heads in the
sand. After all, it would be unrealistic to expect any sharing of the immigration
power, rooted in notions of foreign policy and sovereignty since the late
nineteenth century, not to affect American foreign policy.
Thus, the question is to what extent the states may intrude on that foreign
policy. Most likely, states will operate abroad solely as salespersons and
representatives. Just as states now send governors and trade missions abroad to
solicit business and investment, they may send delegates and employees to
trumpet the benefits of immigration to their states.147 This all might be part of a
142. Citizenship & Immigration Can., Fact Sheet 11: Canada-Quebec Accord (2002),
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/fs-quebec.html.
143. See Tessier, supra note 137, at 230 (noting how the rejection of a previous immigration
agreement, the Meech Lake Accord, sent support for independence to unprecedented levels).
144. For example, other provinces have negotiated agreements governing the provincial delivery of
immigrant settlement services. However, only Quebec has gained the power of actual immigrant
selection. See CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION CAN., ANNUAL REPORT TO PARLIAMENT ON IMMIGRATION
2005, at 13-15 (2005), http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/immigration2005_e.pdf.
145. Citizenship & Immigration Can., supra note 142.
146. Anne Mcllroy, Quebec Holds Key to Harper's Future, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 6, 2006,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/oumalist/story/0,, 1703322,00.html.
147. For example, in the past year alone, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger of California has
traveled to Japan, Mayor Richard M. Daley of Chicago has traveled to China, and Governor Jennifer M.
Granholm of Michigan has traveled to Japan and Germany-all seeking greater foreign investment in
their cities and states. See Jamie Court, The Governor's Odd Traveling Companions, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
15, 2005, at B 11; Evan Osnos, Daley Tries To Tap China's Financial Clout for Chicago, CHI. TRIB.,
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declining trend of federal exclusivity in foreign relations matters, 48 but there
must be limits: states are already prohibited under the Constitution from
entering into treaties or alliances. 149 The most reasonable additional constraint
under DEBI would be for any preference for a particular foreign nation in a
state's admissions plan to receive the explicit consent of Congress at the
adoption stage. Beyond that, states should be given as free a hand as possible to
pursue state goals.
C. Scenarios
The benefits and limitations of the DEBI system in comparison to the
current system are best shown through the following three detailed possible
scenarios.
1. Florida
Florida is a large state with a diverse and growing economy. Under DEBI,
assuming a national quota (as in 2004) of 140,000 for EB immigrants and
131,000 for guest workers,15 0 Florida would be entitled to 8519 EB visas and
7915 guest worker visas based on its relative population.151The DEBI system
would shift the political locus of immigration decision-making from
Washington to Tallahassee. Florida could now set up an application system
(within the constraints set by Congress) that accurately reflected the competing
needs and demands of its citizens, business interests, and general economic
condition. And though this specific power would be new and expansive, the
responsibility and accountability of Florida's democratic government would
not be new. State officials must constantly weigh these competing interests
when deciding on any number of issues, from state benefits to regulatory
enforcement. Thus, there is no particular reason why Florida could not exercise
this new administrative power as competently as its other powers.
Citizens could now petition their government to decrease or increase its
admission of EB immigrants and/or guest workers. Additionally, businesses
and unions in Florida could bring their influence to bear on the state
government. For example, two of Florida's largest industries, "Big Sugar" and
May 17, 2006, at 13; Press Release, State of Michigan, Governor Granholm to Lead Investment Mission
to Japan Later This Month (May 2, 2006), http://www.michigan.gov/nwlb/0,1607,7-242-44714-
142516-,00.html. Indeed, fourteen states already operate business promotion centers in Shanghai
alone. See Osnos, supra.
148. See Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1223 (1999).
149. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
150. See INA § 201(d)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)(3)(C) (2000).
151. See U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates (2006), http://www.census.gov/popest/
estimates.php.
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"Big Citrus,"' 152 could lobby Tallahassee to use its guest worker visa allotment
for their industries. Citrus growers, in particular, have acute labor needs,
growing foreign competition, and difficulties in securing legal farmworkers.1
53
This kind of federalism would facilitate local solutions to local problems.
The nation's critical shortage of nurses,' 54 for example, is particularly
problematic for states like Florida with large, growing populations of retirees.
Congress has responded to this nationwide problem by passing in 1999 the
aforementioned Nursing Relief for Disadvantaged Areas Act, 155 which created
the H-IC.
56
However, that approach was inadequate for a variety of reasons. First,
Congress provided for a class of guest workers-unlike in this scenario, in
which Florida has the option to pursue the recruitment of foreign nurses as
permanent EB immigrants. Second, the national nursing lobby persuaded
Congress to attach stringent conditions for medical facilities to qualify to hire
these H-1C nurses. 15 Finally, strict caps on the number of H-IC visas were
included in the legislation-a mere 50 visas for states with populations over 9
million, and 500 for the nation as a whole.
158
Under DEBI, however, Florida would not be constrained by national
compromises in attending to local problems. 159 In deciding that recruiting
nurses was a long-term goal, Florida would be constrained only by its allotment
152. Peter Wallstein, Sugar, Citrus Industries at Odds with Bush over Free Trade, MIAMI HERALD,
Nov. 3, 2003, at IB ("Big Sugar and citrus growers [are] two of Florida's most influential
industries .... Touting a combined economic impact of $12 billion and more than 100,000 jobs in
Florida, the two industries have embarked on aggressive campaigns designed to remind White House
trade negotiators that if they craft a deal harmful to sugar or citrus, they do so at the president's electoral
peril.").
153. Fritz Roka & Stuart Longworth, Labor Requirements in Florida Citrus 3 (Sept. 2001),
http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/FE/FE30400.pdf ("A real concern remains regarding long-term labor
availability in Florida.... So long as the Florida citrus industry is dependent on imported foreign labor
of questionable legal status, a steady long-term supply of harvest labor will be vulnerable.").
154. See, e.g., Sanjay Gupta, Special Report: U.S. Nursing Shortage 'Going into Crisis,' CNN.COM,
May 8, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/05/07/nursing.shortage/index.htm (describing the
"nursing shortage sweeping the United States" and adding that "[b]y the year 2008, another 450,000
nurses may be needed to meet demand, according to government projections"); Nursing Shortage in
Critical Stage, CBS NEWS, Jan. 17, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/0l/l7/60minutes/
main536999.shtml ("American hospitals are in a serious crisis ... [including] a severe and dangerous
shortage of nurses, a shortage that can best be summed up by the fact that there are now over 120,000
open positions for registered nurses nationwide.").
155. Pub. L. No. 106-95, 113 Stat. 1312 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
156. INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(c) (addressing applicants "who [are] coming temporarily to the United
States to perform services as ... registered nurse[s] .... ).
157. For example, a facility must prove to the Secretary of Labor annually that it is doing such
things as: operating or financing a training facility for registered nurses, paying above-market wages for
registered nurses, and "[p]roviding reasonable opportunities for meaningful salary advancement" for
nurses. See id. §§ 212(m)(2)(B)-(C).
158. Id. § 212(m)(2)(F)(iii)(4).
159. Cf Schuck & Williams, supra note 6, at 376 ("Rather than forcing states to seek relief in
Washington from burdens relating to criminal aliens, federal policymakers should encourage states to
contribute to local solutions." (emphasis added)).
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of visas and the global supply of willing immigrant nurses and trainees., This
option, of course, would not preclude the state from seeking other solutions to
the nursing shortage, such as expanding nurse training and scholarship
opportunities, 161 but it would be a potent option that is currently unavailable.
Thus, this scenario illustrates how one state within DEBI might prioritize
currently underserved occupations.
2. Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska
Depopulation and the brain drain are specters that now haunt many states in
the Midwest, particularly the Great Plains area. 62 Depopulation and its
negative consequences-lost tax revenues, declining standards of living, even a
permanent loss of a "cool factor" 163 -- can mutually reinforce each other,
potentially trapping the states in a dangerous downward spiral. Many of the
affected states have responded with a variety of creative (or desperate)
proposals to stop or reverse the drain-such as exempting young residents from
state taxes (Iowa), 16 4 giving residents free land (Kansas), 165 and forgiving the
student loans of college graduates (North Dakota). 66 Moreover, in an attempt
to "repopulate dying towns," Congress has considered a New Homestead
Act.' 67 The proposed legislation would offer personal and business incentives
for rural young people and entrepreneurs, including college loan repayments,
160. One large source of foreign nurses in past years has been the Philippines. See Warnings Raised
About Exodus of Philippine Doctors and Nurses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at A 16.
161. Office of Pub. Health Nursing, Fla. Dep't of Health, Welcome to the Nursing Student Loan
Forgiveness Program, http://www.nslfp.com/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2007) (noting that the program
"provides funds to assist in the repayment of nursing education loans").
162. See Amanda Paulson, 'Iowa, Come Home!' One State Fights its Brain Drain, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 22, 2003, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1022/pOlsO2-ussc.htm
("The 'brain drain'-a rapid exodus of educated young adults.., has been a concern for Middle
America states for some time now."); Les Christie, Stopping the Great Plains Brain Drain: Iowa is
Proposing To End Income Taxes for the Under-30 Set, CNN MONEY, Feb. 10, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/02/09/pf/iowataxincentive/ ("The [depopulation] story repeats itself
throughout America's heartland, where stagnant or negative population growth has long been the
norm.").
163. See Ronald A. Wirtz, Plugging the Brain Drain, FED. GAZETTE, Jan. 2003, at 6-7, available at
http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/fedgaz/03-01/cover.cfm ("[N]ot even good jobs and wages will stop out-
migration of the young and educated. The wild card [is... the nebulous 'cool factor' of the host state or
region.").
164. See Christie, supra note 162.
165. See Sarah Max, Free Land in the Heartland, CNN MONEY, Dec. 23, 2004,
http://money.cnn.com/2004/12/22/real-estate/buying-selling/thursday-freeland/ ("Ellsworth, [Kansas,]
population of 2,900, is one of many communities throughout the Great Plains looking to reverse decades
of population decline by offering free parcels of land.").
166. Wirtz, supra note 163, at I ("Voters in North Dakota considered a November ballot measure
that would have provided $5,000 for both income tax reduction and student loan forgiveness over five
years to any North Dakota college graduate who stayed in state.").
167. Howard Berkes, The New Homestead Act: New Bill Aims To Repopulate Dying Towns Across
the Great Plains, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, July 27, 2003, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=1342240.
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tax credits for home purchases and business investments, accelerated
equipment depreciation, and venture capital funds, to individuals who locate in
"high out-migration counties."
' 168
States in this predicament have two real problems-one immediate, the
other more long-term. The immediate problem is labor: depopulation leads to
labor shortages (assuming that high unemployment is not what is causing the
depopulation in the first place), which further exacerbates the state's economic
and fiscal situation. The addition of willing immigrant labor might help to
alleviate the situation, for example with Iowa's large agriculture and hog-
raising industries. 69
The second underlying problem is demographic. How can these states
reverse the trend? They can attempt to woo people to their states with financial
incentives, as illustrated above. They can pitch their quality of life advantages,
as Iowa's Governor Vilsack has done. 170 They can lobby Congress for more
federal funds and attention, as they did with the New Homestead Act. All of
these things have been done, and may yet be successful. However, DEBI would
offer another tool for these states. With the ability to invite employment-
seeking immigrants, the affected states would be able to address both the
immediate and long-term problems in a new way. Perhaps an immigrant who
comes to Kansas for a short-term job might decide it is in her best interests to
stay for a longer period of time.
Also, with their visa allotment, these states would be able to woo
immigrants who might not otherwise have considered living in the heartland.
Of course, these immigrants, particularly the permanent ones, could not be
forced to stay. While guest workers might be geographically constrained due to
the necessity of remaining near their place of employment, 171 LPR immigrants
would be completely free, as they are now, to move and work anywhere in the
country, and therefore would not be subject to state influence beyond the
application stage. Thus, states would only have a window of opportunity to
recruit or woo immigrants to stay longer. At the very least, however, these
states would gain the benefit of guest workers. Indeed, it is even possible that
the addition of more immigrants, with their accompanying restaurants, shops,
and culture might add to these states' "cool factor."'
172
168. For more details of Senator Dorgan's proposal, see Byron L. Dorgan, The New Homestead
Act of 2005, http://dorgan.senate.gov/issues/northdakota/homestead/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
169. For more information on migrants and Iowa's $28 billion hog industry, see Migrants and
Pork, RURAL MIGRATION NEWS, Apr. 1999, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=375_0 5_0.
170. See Paulson, supra note 162, at 1.
171. The degree of constraint would depend upon their host state's rules on visa portability. If visas
are very portable, guest workers could move about the state with more ease.
172. See Shaila Dewan, Cities Compete in Hipness Battle To Attract Young, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
2006, at AI (noting that large international and gay urban populations are strong indicators of popularity
with young, college-educated workers).
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Another possibility with this scenario would be the utilization of compacts.
Clearly the difficulties these states are facing are not isolated to any one state
alone-they are regional issues. Compacts, duly approved by Congress, would
enable a regional approach to the problem. Forming such a compact, Iowa,
Kansas, and Nebraska could pool their visa allotments, harmonize their
admissions and labor protection criteria, and jointly prioritize the type of labor
needed. Such an approach could showcase the entire region and go hand-in-
hand with other joint economic regional initiatives such as the New Homestead
Act. Immigration is not a panacea to the region's problems, but the DEBI
system would offer a new, more targeted option to these states, without
necessarily detracting from the needs of their sister states.
3. Oregon
Federalism encourages states to act as "laboratories" for experimentation.'
73
To take a state with a recent history of such varied policy experimentation
(including mail-in voting and physician-assisted suicide), suppose that Oregon
decides to further decentralize its admissions system under DEBI by auctioning
its yearly visas or by allocating them on a first-come, first-served basis and
avoiding state labor certifications or other administrative hassles. The state
would only check for basic health information, a criminal record, and an
employment offer.
This type of system would resemble the proposals of some academics. For
example, Michael Trebilcock at the University of Toronto Law School has
proposed such a completely decentralized system:
Current policies in many countries requiring that employers first ensure that no
domestic workers are qualified for the job, or demanding that the employer
demonstrate that the employment of the foreign worker at issue would not harm
domestic workers, should be abandoned. If an employer has extended its
recruitment drive to encompass foreign labor markets and is willing to absorb the
additional transaction costs associated with sponsorship of a foreign worker, then
this commitment should be considered to be prima facie evidence that equally
qualified workers are not available domestically.
While adopting such a system at the national level under our current system
might appear too radical, and might meet fierce resistance from certain interest
groups, a state could afford to experiment with simpler, more streamlined
administrative procedures without imperiling the entire nation.
The sine qua non of that system would be the offer of employment, which
173. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 327 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[B]ut
also the interest of the States to serve as laboratories for innovation and experimentation."); New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
174. Michael J. Trebilcock, The Law and Economics of Immigration Policy, 5 AM. L. & ECON.
REv. 271, 287 (2003).
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"is the best single assurance that an economic need is being met.., and that
economic-stream immigration occurs in an orderly fashion."'' 5 Furthermore,
the application fees could be modified as they are in an auction to reflect supply
and demand in the state. Only those employers willing to pay more to sponsor
EB immigrants or guest workers would even apply. Minimum wage laws and
labor standards would also still apply, so the risk that employers would be
willing to pay high sponsorship fees in order to recoup their costs through
exploitation would be minimal. Finally, the executive, in its national security
capacity, would continue to screen through the visa process to ensure that those
being sponsored pose no danger to the country.
Alternatively, Oregon might adopt an objective point system for its EB
immigrants, as Canada has done. 176 Because EB immigrants, as opposed to
guest workers, are permanent additions to the country and labor force, Oregon
might consider it more of an imperative to seek people with the skills necessary
for long-term success, including language ability, education, and technical
skills. 177 Finally, Oregon might adopt other reforms and proposals, such as
privatizing the verification and processing of visa applications. 1
78
III. NATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF DEBI
DEBI proposes to abolish one central regime, with all its benefits and
flaws, and to replace it with a federal one composed of over fifty different
systems. Such a change is not to be undertaken lightly. The reform would not
be as drastic as it might at first appear, however, and its many benefits would
outweigh its costs.
A. Complexity of the Immigration System
Under what Peter Schuck calls the "audience principle" of legal
complexity, the "complexity of a rule should be tailored to the sophistication
and cost-bearing capacities of those who will have to interpret and implement
it."1 79 Thus, any change in complexity must first be viewed from the
175. PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 61, at 147.
176. See Citizenship & Immigration Can., Six Selection Factors and Pass Mark (Nov. 20, 2006),
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/skilled/qual-5.html (describing the point system and requirements for entry
as a skilled worker).
177. Cf Stephen Yale-Loehr & Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt, A Comparative Look at Immigration
and Human Capital Assessment, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 99, 107 (2001) ("Even if a point system were not
clearly superior to other methods of selecting skilled migrants as determined by the long-term economic
contributions made by those migrants, implementing such a system would still yield a separate
procedural advantage: streamlining the immigration process and yielding transparent, objective, and
flexible criteria for selecting skilled immigrants.").
178. See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 54, at 33.
179. Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1,
45 (1992).
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perspective of the various members of our audience. An initial perspective is
that of the immigrant-applicant, who might file her own application (a self-
petitioning applicant) or be sponsored by an employer who files on her behalf
(a non-self-petitioning applicant). If a state allowed certain EB applicants to
self-petition, in a cost-distribution analysis' those self-petitioners might
disproportionately bear the burden of familiarization with multiple state
systems. Though this difficulty would be limited only to states that allowed
self-petitions, there would likely be more material for a potential self-petitioner
to process, not less.
However, this increased difficulty for self-petitioners would be mitigated
by two aspects of DEBI. First, under the current system, only EB-l "priority
workers" may self-petition without a job offer or labor certification.' 81 And this
preference category, due to its high bar of "extraordinary ability," is small.
Thus, if the states ultimately, in the aggregate, created more self-petition
categories than are currently allowed, the greater variety and rule complexity of
DEBI would likely be offset by the greater freedom and number of slots
allowed. If, on the other hand, states slashed or eliminated self-petitions, the
greater rule complexity (i.e., the difficulty in interpreting the law) 182 would not
matter, and the group of EB-I immigrants affected would be a small fraction of
the number of economic immigrants allowed in.
Secondly, as mentioned above, self-petitioners would be able to cope and
adapt to a more diverse system through the assistance of legal counsel. 183 In
fact, any greater complexity would be handled mainly by immigration
specialists and not by the applicants themselves. This is not to imply that there
would be no added costs, as this might add to the cost of legal services.
However, coupled with increased entry opportunities due to the possibility of
more self-petitioning visas, it would counterbalance the negative impact of
change. Additionally, if some states adopted more transparent admissions
criteria (like Canada's point system"') than our current system employs, self-
petitioners might also find those expanded opportunities to more than
compensate for any change.
As for non-self-petitioning EB immigrants, any increase in complexity
(from rules or otherwise) would be borne by their sponsor-employers. If the
main requirement for most EB visas is a valid job offer given by a
knowledgeable employer, then it would not matter to the immigrant whose laws
180. See id.
181. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
182. See DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 266-67 (1986) (discussing three
forms of complexity within the context of the income tax).
183. This might, admittedly, be seen as a self-serving solution to the problem of legal complexity,
coming as it does from a law student.
184. See supra note 176.
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were being followed, so long as the employer knew and complied. For most
employers, moreover, the changes of DEBI would have little negative impact.
As most businesses are not continent-spanning Fortune 500 companies, an
employer interested in hiring foreign help would only have to acquaint itself
with the relevant laws and regulations in the states in which it operates. This
might well be balanced by small- to mid-sized businesses' enhanced
opportunities for lobbying at the state level. Thus, overall, the shift in
complexity should be neutral for businesses of this size.
Large corporations, on the other hand, would encounter most of the
challenges and opportunities of change. Rule and compliance complexity
185
would undoubtedly increase, as large corporations would need to familiarize
themselves with the rules of several states instead of just one national system.
However, this increased complexity would also give large corporations the
opportunity to "shop" for states with the least complex or cumbersome
immigration rules. Under the current system, if a large agribusiness, such as
ADM, wanted to hire more unskilled farm workers and was denied, they would
have no other (legal) recourse. Under DEBI, by contrast, that company could
selectively apply for EB visas in receptive states, and would have opportunities
for greater lobbying clout in state capitals. While not a perfect solution in that a
company might perhaps be unable to hire workers in all its desired states, it
could at least hire workers in some of them. States would also have the proper
incentives to compete with one another for business with regard to
transparency, efficiency, speed, and other factors. Thus, from both cost
distribution and audience principles, corporations, as sophisticated market
players and the most likely beneficiaries of DEBI, should bear the costs in an
equitable reform.
Finally, the efficiency of a decentralized system need not compare
unfavorably to the current system. This is primarily due to the fact that our
immigration system, with its dispersed enforcement and service facilities, is
already unavoidably decentralized. Therefore, the crux of the efficiency matter
is, as with enforcement, coordination through information technologies. But as
Schuck notes, the pursuance of efficiency often requires more complex rules.1
86
For example, DEBI's use of a national immigration database, though simple in
concept, requires a system of reporting requirements, access criteria, security
policies, and other technical regulations. However, regardless of whether DEBI
is implemented or not, the federal government will still need to coordinate its
diffuse administrative network with the states in order to work effectively.
Indeed, more effective coordination among government agencies was one of
185. "Compliance complexity" refers to how difficult it is to comply with the law. For example, in
the tax preparation context, this would include such things as record keeping, filling out the proper
forms, calculating numbers properly, and so forth. See BRADFORD, supra note 182, at 266-67.
186. See Schuck, supra note 179, at 37.
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the main motivating factors behind the incorporation of the immigration
bureaucracy within the Department of Homeland Security. Linking state bodies




Implementation of DEBI would cause a moderate shift in administrative
costs from the federal government to the states, for three reasons. First, the
states already administer, and pay for, a large part of our current immigration
system, particularly in the labor certification area. Second, the federal
government would retain many important and costly aspects of immigration.
And third, the states would be expected to finance administrative expenses
through application fees and/or taxpayer funds.
As is noted above, 188 the State Employment Security Agency is the
administrative gatekeeper to the labor certification system. Thus, states are
already responsible for much of the cost of this system. And though the federal
government may reimburse the states for some of their costs, as it did in
originally imposing the mandate, 189 the responsibility for maintaining these
offices already rests with the states. If states had greater power to add to their
current responsibilities, they could enact fee-based immigration systems that
could pay for any administrative costs. The states would not be dependent on
disbursements from the federal government. The federal government's
responsibilities and expenses in the areas of enforcement and overseas/border
administration would remain unchanged.
Additionally, the enactment of application fees would have a salutary effect
on the complexity of the system as a whole. Reasonable processing and
application fees would deter most applicants from random or frivolous
applications and would prevent the number of applications from growing to an
unmanageable degree. Moreover, because a fee-based application system
would finance itself, states could hire more processors to address the demand.
And, of course, states could choose to underwrite part or all of the cost of their
systems to compete with other states.
C. Naturalization, Adjustment of Status, and Changing of Status
1. Adjustment of Status
The barrier between immigrants and nonimmigrants is not impermeable.
187. See Lyman, supra note 97.
188. See discussion supra Subsection l.B.I.
189. See 29 U.S.C. § 49(c) (2000).
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Under section 245 of the INA, certain nonimmigrants can adjust to permanent
resident status while still in the United States.190 Under the current system,
nonimmigrants seeking adjustment must still meet all the admissions criteria
for immigrants and not be inadmissible under any of the provisions of INA
section 212. And if they are approved, there is a corresponding reduction in the
class of preference visas to which the noncitizen had been admitted. 191 Thus, a
nonimmigrant from Argentina, admitted on a "J" student visa, who marries an
American citizen could adjust to permanent resident status as an "immediate
relative" subclass of family-sponsored visa. 192 Correspondingly, there would be
a reduction of one in the number of preference visas authorized to the FS
immigrant category and Argentina for that year.
Adjustment of status for employment-based noncitizens would operate
similarly under DEBI. As described above, states would be given as free a hand
as possible to use their entire quota of EB visas within the time period
prescribed by Congress. However, adjustment of status under DEBI would pose
slight logistical issues, depending on whether the adjustment was within a state
or across states. Thus, internally, a state would be able to adjust a guest worker
to LPR status, so long as the state still had an available immigrant visa from its
annual allocation. For example, if a guest worker in North Carolina applied for
an LPR slot from any state and was accepted, the accepting state's LPR
allotment would be reduced by one. The status of the vacated guest worker slot,
on the other hand, would depend on the amount of elapsed time from the
original allotment to the state. If still within the use-or-lose window, North
Carolina would be able to reuse that slot for another suitable candidate. If past
that window, the slot would simply expire.
Adjustment of status across states would be only slightly more
complicated, in that two states instead of one would need to notify the federal
government of the adjustment through the national immigration database. Such
adjustments would offer another area for interstate competition, as states
actively seek out desirable LPR candidates from both their own and other
states' guest worker populations. Thus, returning to the second scenario in
Section II.B above, as Iowa's Governor Vilsack toured other states encouraging
young people to consider his state, one could imagine a state official visiting
190. See INA§ 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2000). Lawfully admitted permanent residents have the right
to travel and work in most professions, and so have no need to adjust to nonimmigrant status. See U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, Now That You Are a Permanent Resident,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (search for page title) (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
191. See INA § 245(b) ("[T]he Secretary of State shall reduce by one the number of the preference
visas authorized to be issued under sections 202 [concerning foreign state numerical limitations] and 203
[concerning immigrant preference categories] within the class to which the alien is chargeable for the
fiscal year then current.").
192. The nonimmigrant in this case would, of course, have to prove that the marriage was bona
fide. INA § 245(e) (conditioning status on whether "the alien establishes by clear and convincing
evidence to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the marriage was entered into in good faith").
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other states' guest workers and encouraging them to apply.
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2. Changing and Renewal of Status
Changing of status, the term for moving from one type of nonimmigrant
visa to a different type of nonimmigrant visa, would be slightly more
complicated. In its simplest form, however, the changing from a non-
employment-based visa to a guest worker visa would also result in a
corresponding deduction from a state's quota. So, for example, if a foreign
student on a "J" visa applied for and received a guest worker visa from Iowa,
one visa would be deducted from Iowa's allocation. By contrast, if Hawaii
divided its guest worker allocation into four classes, a worker's switching from
one class to another would be purely an internal state administrative matter and
would not result in any deduction.
Changing of status also touches on the question of whether a state would be
permitted to "renew" a guest worker's status under DEBI. Though it should be
permitted, that question ultimately must be decided by Congress. The
possibility of multiple renewals, with no pathway for lawful permanent
residence, might strike some as unethical, undesirable, or prone to abuse. Thus,
there might need to be limits on the possibility or frequency of renewals. Yet
should renewals be permitted, guest workers could change status across states,
as with adjustment of status. Finally, states would have to notify the federal
government through the national immigration database of any change,
adjustment, or renewal of status. That notification would allow the federal




Naturalization is the conferring of U.S. citizenship upon a person after
birth, 195 and under DEBI it would remain solely a federal matter. Congress
would set the criteria-e.g., good character, residency, English proficiency-
193. This role is not at all unusual for public officials at the state and local levels. As mentioned
above, Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago has visited China, seeking greater Chinese investment. While
he was there, officials bemoaned the visa difficulties that Chinese investors encountered in the United
States as compared to Europe. See Osnos, supra note 147.
194. INA § 245 (requiring the executive's approval for adjustment of status applications).
195. 2005 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at 1. There are several requirements for naturalization. They
include residence in the United States for five continuous years immediately preceding application, see
INA § 316(a), an understanding of the English language, see id. § 312(a)(1), and an oath of renunciation
and allegiance, see id. § 337. There are also many exceptions and special naturalization procedures for
various categories of applicants. See, e.g., id. § 316(f) (persons making extraordinary contributions to
national security); id. § 328 (naturalization through service in the armed forces); id. § 329A
(posthumous citizenship through death while on active-duty in the armed forces in any period of military
hostilities). Generally speaking, however, a lawfully admitted permanent resident who meets all the
aforementioned requirements and is "of good moral character" can be naturalized. See id. § 3 16(a)(3).
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and only the federal government could approve a noncitizen's application for
citizenship. Moreover, the federal government would continue to confer
citizenship for LPR immigrants admitted under the family-sponsored or
diversity programs as well as certain groups of special concern, such a
noncitizens who have served in the U.S. armed forces.
19 6
However, as residency currently is one of the main requirements for
citizenship,' 97 the states through DEBI would affect the naturalization process.
As the gatekeepers for employment-based immigration, the states would also
become the selectors of a large part of each incoming naturalization class. Short
of separating the residency requirement from naturalization entirely, states
could not have a role in the selection of permanent immigrants without also
impacting the naturalization pipeline. And while the executive could always
choose to reject citizenship applications for national security or other reasons,
the vast majority of interested noncitizens, once in possession of a green card,
would likely be approved over time. In the end, there is no escaping this
ramification of DEBI. However, if states can be considered competent to select
those immigrants willing to work and build lives in our country, the fact of
these workers eventually becoming citizens might not appear to be such a
negative at all.
D. Immigrant Rights
Federalism can also function as a steam-valve. In the immigration context,
Spiro has described this steam-valve effect as the capacity of "those states
harboring intense anti-alien sentiment to act on those sentiments at the state
level, thus diminishing any interest on their part to seek national legislation to
similarly restrictionist ends."'198 The absence of such a steam-valve in the
immigration arena has been thought by some to be a contributing factor to the
flashes of anti-immigration legislation at the national level, such as those that
prompted the Chinese Exclusion Act. Presumably, areas with high anti-
immigrant sentiment are unable to affect change at the local level, and thus
forced to seek immigration restrictions in Congress. And due to the nature of
political logrolling, a small interest group with an intense preference pitted
against the neutral posture of other, larger groups may prevail in the
legislature.
1 99
While some scholars dispute this steam-valve theory as an explanation for
every instance of major restrictionist legislation,20 steam-valve federalism is a
196. See INA § 328.
197. See id. § 316(a)-(c).
198. Spiro, supra note 7, at 1627.
199. Id. at 1634; see also Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 195,
205 (2000).
200. See Wishnie, supra note 84, at 556 ("But the [clogged steam-valve] claim does not explain
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well understood aspect of public choice analysis generally. Thus, greater local
input in EB admissions under DEBI might help to reduce pressure at the state
level before it percolates up to Washington. For example, interest groups
currently threatened by the influx of tech workers from such places as India
would be able to oppose their entry within their own states. Perennial high-
stakes fights in Congress over the number of HI-B visas might thereby be
scattered across the several states, as congressional debate focused on total
immigration cap-setting. Ultimately, tech workers might be funneled through
the visa market into high-demand states and deflected from high-resistance
states, resulting in greater overall opportunities for economic growth and
human happiness.
Moreover, the adoption stages of DEBI would ensure continual, effective
congressional oversight in which state plans would be subjected to a second
level of scrutiny at the national level. State proposals would not only be looked
at by members of Congress and their committee staff, but also by concerned
citizens, interest groups, and the press. In time, interest groups concerned with
the welfare of immigrants would likely develop expertise in the area, maintain
lists of concerned members, and cultivate contacts with the press. Thus, should
any state propose something egregious, it would be unlikely to pass unnoticed.
Additionally, the concentration of executive resources on areas like
immigration enforcement and public benefits would also result in an increase in
immigrant welfare. Inefficient enforcement actions undermine public
confidence 201 in the entire immigration system and do few favors for exploited
workers and noncitizens of undetermined status, as they must wait for years for
final resolution of their status. The inefficient security screening and processing
of lawful immigrants inflicts incalculable costs on tens of thousands of people
and diminishes American competitiveness in the global labor market.
20
2
Finally, lax enforcement and inefficient processing may inflict dignitary harms
on lawful immigrants, as they suffer from the conflation of lawful-unlawful
status in the public's perception and from the denigration of their patience and
forbearance in going through official channels. Thus, a reorganized Department
of Labor, unencumbered with labor certifications, could take on a law
enforcement role, performing raids on workplace violators and responding to
adequately passage of three anti-immigrant statutes in 1996, nor passage of other major restrictionist
legislation in the last century." (footnote omitted)).
201. See, e.g., Jerry Seper, Minuteman Border Patrol Raises Opposition in Texas, WASH. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 2005, at A4 (quoting Texas Governor Rick Perry as saying that "[tihe federal government can
and must do more to close the border to illegal immigration. Until that happens, these kinds of citizen-
initiated efforts likely will be the result. If you want to send the Minutemen home, I urge you to make
sure we have enough federal agents on the border to secure it.").
202. See Associated Press, Decline in Foreign Grad Students Raises Alarms, MSNBC NEWS, Nov.
16, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6462790/ (attributing the third straight year of decline in
foreign graduate students to immigration policies and to increased competition from Europe, China, and
India).
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complaints from maltreated immigrant workers. In short, efficient immigration
enforcement can be an immigrants' rights issue.
The executive will also continue its quasi-adjudicatory review functions
through the BIA. The BIA will ensure at the appellate level that states are
treating admitted 20 3 noncitizens according to the law in a fair manner. From the
BIA, the federal courts will remain open to immigrants with constitutional and
statutory claims. In conclusion, decentralization in decision-making need mean
neither the forsaking of federal protection for noncitizens, nor that states will
turn into "laboratories of bigotry."
20 4
E. Discrimination
Discrimination is inseparable from any system of immigration control.
Except in an open borders system, some will always be favored or disfavored
for limited legal entry opportunities. 205 Thus, the only federalism issue is how
much authority to favor and to discriminate is appropriately handed to the
states.
Consistent with the principles of decentralized EB immigration, the federal
government could choose to respond to discrimination concerns either
proactively or reactively. As a boundary, limit-setting matter, Congress could
proactively pass legislation prohibiting states from using factors such as race,
religion, national origin, or sexual orientation in employment-based admissions
decisions. Or, Congress could simply disallow a state's selection criteria at the
adoption stage, should some aspect of that criteria be thought to violate national
values.
The judiciary would have little role in this form of state discrimination.
Recall that DEBI doesn't involve the devolution of federal admission power
but a system that would allow for greater institutionalized input from state
governments in employment-based admissions decisions. Thus, any state
admission criteria not proactively or reactively forbidden by Congress would
have the explicit authorization of the federal government through adoption. As
the Supreme Court has held that federal immigration and naturalization laws
are subject only to rational basis review under the Fourteenth Amendment,
federally authorized differential treatment of noncitizens by states is, as of yet,
constitutional.20 6 Of course, parties with standing could appeal an adverse state
203. Only admitted noncitizens would have standing to raise a claim. Disgruntled applicants,
without any legal claim to a visa or even access to the U.S. administrative or federal court system, would
as now have no avenue for relief.
204. See Wishnie, supra note 84, at 493.
205. Examples abound throughout the history of American immigration. Prominent examples of
favoritism and prejudice include, respectively, the treatment of Cuban refugees and the Chinese
Exclusion Act.
206. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (upholding alienage classifications in federal
Medicare law).
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decision from the BIA to the federal courts if that decision were thought
contrary to the express commands of Congress. In conclusion, the overall
structure of DEBI is flexible enough to accommodate a primarily proactive or
reactive federal government-as long as decisions affecting the nation as a
whole are eventually decided at the federal level.
CONCLUSION
Immigration need not remain an exclusively federal concern. Rather, it can
be conceptually bifurcated into federal and local provinces. When it is
important to speak with one national voice-on questions such as total
immigration levels, family reunification, and refugee acceptance--decisions
are better made at the federal level. For employment-based immigration, by
contrast, there can be benefits to diversifying the centers of decision-making.
When viewed as an economic matter, federal immigration exclusivity begins to
appear more and more anomalous. In education, taxation, commerce, and
public safety, among many other areas, the states have long been full partners
with the federal government.
Indeed, as the states under our federalist system of government already
function as centers of independent decision-making, and not mere
administrative provinces of one unitary national government, they may readily
take up additional responsibilities in the employment-based immigration
sphere. It is thus the goal of DEBI to provide such a framework for the federal
government to work in partnership with the states. However, in the end, this
proposal is not so much about any one particular mechanism for power-sharing
as much as furthering a debate regarding how we may, as a "nation of
immigrants," best manage immigration in a manner that is more flexible and
adaptive to local needs and concerns, while continuing to ensure national
standards of dignity and fairness.

